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Contents

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Cover art is by Charles Chu.

Please note: Our publication date is, by coincidence only, the same as
the day which is celebrated in Peking as the National Day of China,
and should not be interpreted as having any symbolic meaning.

Some time ago, the China Concerns Committee of New
York Yearly Meeting approached Friends Journal with
the idea of a special issue on China. The Committee has
had a continuing concern to promote understanding and
intervisitation between Chinese and Friends, to overcome
racial and cultural barriers, and to examine Chinese ap­
proaches to problems which are troubling the U.S.

The Journal concurred about the value of such an
issue, and we regret that the limitations of space have
made it impossible to publish many articles. We are
grateful to all for the patience they have had with the
logistics of producing this issue. And we are particularly
indebted to Ned Lyle, whose assistance and consultation
have made this issue possible.

The China Concerns Committee wishes to hear from
Friends who, like them, hope to discover what way may
be open to be of service in furthering understanding
between Chinese and Americans. They may be reached at:
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FRIENDS
AND CHINA

by Lewis M. Hoskins

A merican Quakers have for years been intrigued with China. It probably is not the exotic history of the country nor the huge numbers of the population, nor their potential growth. More likely it is the realization that these hard-working people, despite enormous deterrents, have achieved almost impossible heights, largely without the "advantages" of the Western tradition flowing from Aristotle, Jesus, Caesar, Augustine, Luther, Pasteur, da Vinci, or many other Western notables. We are unfamiliar with their own "greats" except for a few names that intrude in our Western libraries: Confucius, Lin Yu-Tang, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung, and the dynasties that are remembered for an artist or poet.

Nevertheless, our interest has led many Friends to see in traditional China a mirror image of Western people. Perhaps it is the theme of Yin-Yang, symbol of balance and harmony, or the confidence of the Chinese that a successful ruling regime is confirmed by the "Mandate of Heaven." For some, it is the spectacle of a huge country with an enormous population managing in a short time to pull itself out of the morass arising from over a quarter-century of modern warfare. Poverty has been greatly reduced, long steps have been taken toward equality as compared to the past, and a powerful government controls the society domestically and commands respect internationally. For some it is the appearance of a successful Communist order that has broken new ground while paying tribute to Marx and Lenin. A vigorous secular "religion" has largely rejected the old religions from the East or the West. The price has been substantial, but few of today's Chinese appear to have much nostalgia for the old regime.

Friends have followed rather closely the changing scene of twentieth century China. The transformations in Chinese history have been dramatic. A number of Quakers played modest roles in these events. English and U.S. missionaries facilitated the establishment of two Chinese yearly meetings, one in West China, another near Nanking. Other Quaker groups grew in cities like Canton, Shanghai and Peking. Several Chinese Quakers played important roles in education and in other professions. There is hope and some evidence that Christianity has left a contribution with the older generation.

During World War II, British Friends and like-minded people sent the China Convoy of the Friends Ambulance Unit to help the Chinese people who were in serious short supply of medicines and medical services. For more than three years the FAU trucked medicines and equipment over treacherous roads to hospitals in West China. Possibly ninety percent of the needed supplies for civilian hospitals was conveyed by the unit during several war years. The unit, re-christened the Friends Service Unit and joined by U.S., Canadian, and New Zealand personnel, turned to reconstruction, refugee rehabilitation and technical assistance after the war. Medical work remained an important service and medical teams were sent to meet special needs. One of these was Medical Team 19, an international group who served the International Peace Hospital in Yenan, the northern, cave capital of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues. This was both symbol and reality of the Quaker principle of non-partisan aid to the Chinese people, as reconstruction work proceeded on both sides of the ideological split that soon erupted again, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese and worldwide war.

Epidemic control, notably the campaign against the dread childhood disease, Kala-Azar, was carried out by FSU along the Yellow River Valley. This was handicapped but not halted by recurring battles. Communist medical services were able to continue to carry on this effective campaign as Friends withdrew in about 1950. They now report its eradication. Other Quaker contributions include the rehabilitation and restaffing of a number of hospitals made derelict by the war. Chinese colleagues, trained in medical and mechanical services, have continued to meet these vital needs, and now the government has greatly expanded medical facilities throughout the countryside with paramedical teams and modern hospitals.

That these Quaker services have been appreciated is evidenced by the cordial welcome extended to several Friendly visitors who have returned to China, drawn back by their love of the people and the country. They have all been impressed by the dramatic transformations carried out by the Chinese largely through their own efforts under the popular slogan "Serve the People." The most recent international delegation spent August of this year as guests of the Ministry of Health and was composed mainly of former members of M.T. 19.

Though their roles have been basically non-political, Friends who have served in China have not escaped political dilemmas. While there, the unit and its members wrestled with difficult choices. With headquarters located

Lewis M. Hoskins, professor of history at Earlham College, is also responsible for the Overseas Study Program. A former member of the Friends Ambulance Unit in China, he has just returned from a trip to that country. He is a member of Clear Creek (IN) Meeting.
in and supplies coming through Nationalist China, how could Quaker non-partisanship be exhibited in the midst of a bitter civil war? The deteriorating National government, plagued with graft and corruption, was ineffectual and brought disillusion. With our sympathies clearly won by the humanitarian accomplishments of the Communists, how could most Friends support progress carried out to a considerable extent by military threat? In a desire to serve the Chinese people, could pacifists work under government agencies that were inevitably and patently political, be they Nationalist or Communist? Could individual Friends join in patriotic holidays and celebrations that had now become intensely ideological and often anti-Christian?

Today's Friends have not escaped new dilemmas. While usually approving "normalization" of U.S.-China relations, can we lightly urge U.S. withdrawal of the "special relationship" to Taiwan without some indication that reunification will not be sought by military might—a guarantee unlikely to be made by the Chinese government? While the loss of life in the perspective of history has not been great with the Communist take-over, can the dissident refugees or opponents liquidated be forgotten? Or has the reorientation training program for former Kuomintang supporters, carried out rigorously by the new regime, been an example of the achievement of a high degree of national unity by education and training rather than by force? Is the renewal of the Cold War with the USSR a comfortable price to pay for rapprochement with China? What efforts can Friends make to speed normalization and better understanding that do not implicitly become politically partisan, praising the present government of China indiscriminately?

Some of these questions are addressed in articles in this issue of Friends Journal. Friends and all Americans need to address them directly. Their answers, arising from renewed debate and discussion, are overdue. This issue is designed to forward their serious consideration.

The Hope China Offers Us

by Philip West

These days our discussions of hope are more serious than any time I can remember. One senses the prevailing mood of anxiety and discouragement. The problems of inflation, pollution, crime, and energy appear to be insoluble. At the center of our malaise are deep doubts about values we have held. The magic of industrialization and growth are gone. In the words of Robert Heilbroner, we have spent our time chasing the "bluebird of consumption." Many of us have seen the bluebird at close range—two cars, swimming pools, meat any time we want. Hoosier Energy, advertising on the radio, informs us that the American yearly consumption of electricity for air-conditioning alone is more than China's total yearly consumption for both home and industrial uses. And it proudly announces it will continue to meet the growing demand. But instant body comfort and other bluebirds are not the answer. The initial excitement is passing, and the great problems of life and death are still with us.

We wonder if the values and the social order we have built with them will carry us into the next century. The truism that societies in the past were confronted with similar crises is small comfort, for history shows us that civilizations in the past have faced challenges too large for them to handle and have died.

What does this discouraging outlook have to do with China? Does China today have anything to show us? On the surface it may appear that the problems of Western people have little to do with China's recent experience. Thirty-four years ago it was the symbol of the ravages of war, chaos, and starvation. China then was the object of our missions, philanthropy and aid, but hardly a mirror to ourselves. Five years later, in 1949, China had a revolution and our prevailing images changed to totalitarian control and Soviet expansion. In the 1940s we were China's ally in the war against Japan, but the 1950s began with war between U.S. and Chinese soldiers in Korea. Very quickly China became a bitter enemy, an
object of our hatred, still hardly a mirror. Politicians, scholars, and missionaries heatedly debated the question "who lost China." These conflicting images of friendship, benevolence, suspicion, and contempt likely exist in varying degrees within each one of us today.

Whatever the combination before, China in the 1970s has become an object of our respect and serious attention. In a very real sense it has already become a mirror for ourselves. The differences remain, but meaningful points of comparison are there. China may be poor, but in its poverty it may be more stable and capable of feeding its millions, four times the size of our own population, than we are of feeding our poor. Reports indicate that China has experienced no inflation over the last twenty years, while inflation is fast eroding the confidence in our economic system. The historian, Arnold Toynbee, has written China has one "important negative advantage. She has not yet committed herself to unlimited mechanization, industrialization, and urbanization. In consequence, China today has greater freedom of manoeuvre...." In fact Toynbee wonders if China's chances of survival into the twenty-first century may not be better than our own. If there is a place where people have a sense of hope today, it is China.

Two hundred years ago, during the Age of Enlightenment, leading European philosophers drew upon their knowledge of China as they debated the large questions of their day. Europe had passed through wars between churches and between the newly emerging nation states. The age was marked by a breakdown of authority and tradition. One of the issues European thinkers debated was the kind of government that should be established in the wake of disorder. Those who favored benevolent despotism sometimes turned to the emperor system of China. China offered a model, not of popular government, but of a humane and enlightened despotism, based not upon the exercise of force but on gentle persuasion and knowledge. China in their eyes was a place where the monarch ruled by virtue and the people were happy.

These European thinkers also opposed the hold of theological dogma over people's minds and argued for a more optimistic view of human nature. Here too they turned to Confucian thought which they believed had risen above superstition and provided a convincing example of natural as opposed to revealed religion. The prevalence of morality and rationality in Chinese society, from the Emperor to the farmer, and their successful incorporation into a system of social and political relations provided a clue to the strength and continuity of Chinese civilization.

These positive images were based to a large extent on the writings of Jesuit missionaries who went to China in the sixteenth century and established a mission among the ruling elite that lasted for almost two centuries and stands as a unique monument in the history of Christian missions in China. Led by Matteo Ricci, these members of the Society of Jesus mastered the Chinese language and the Confucian classics and adapted themselves to Chinese customs. They established a mission in Peking, near the imperial throne and built two large cathedrals within the city walls. Drawing upon their superior education in Europe at the time, they offered their skills to the emperor as mathematicians, astronomers, craftsmen, architects, and painters. So close were they to the throne that several sons of the illustrious K'ang Hsi emperor, who ruled for sixty years, were converted to Christianity. Other court officials understandably became jealous of the imperial favor shown to these missionaries and fought the mission. But with only minor interruptions the mission was tolerated and continued to grow. By the end of the eighteenth century it is estimated that more than 100,000 Chinese, many of them scholars and high officials, were converted. The Jesuit mission was eventually destroyed, in part by opposition within China, but more by the jealousy of rival missions, notably the Dominicans and Franciscans, who inveighed against the flexible approach of the Jesuits and won the support of the pope. The Jesuit order was banned in Europe in 1774 and the Jesuit mission in China effectively came to an end.

Another Western admirer of China was Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy's attention to China is small in the huge corpus of his writings, and yet it is instructive. His discovery of China came relatively late in life, toward the end of the nineteenth century, when Western admiration of China and Chinoiserie [collecting and imitating of things Chinese] were at a low point. But even the China in the declining years of the Ch'ing dynasty served as a kind of mirror for Tolstoy's thinking. He sympathized with the victims of Western imperialism, which included China, but unlike many of his contemporaries, he was not contemptuous of China's helpless response. Rather it reflected an understanding of life which was to be respected and admired.

Tolstoy opposed the artificiality and competitiveness that came with industrialization, and he spent the last decades of his life trying to bring people back to the simplicity of religious life and rural living. China offered some help, but in contrast to the Enlightenment thinkers, he was more interested in Taoism than Confucianism. He condemned the despotic government of the Ch'ing rulers, who were the patrons of Confucianism, but he admired the peasant masses whom he thought embodied the Taoist (and Buddhist) virtues of harmony and the idea of non-action, or wu-wei, which coincided with his own doctrine of non-resistance.

Just as Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance became a minor almost inaudible theme amidst the expansion and growth of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so too Taoist and Confucian China in most Western minds lost respect and became the object of contempt or pity. This contempt was shared by scientists, Marxists, and missionaries alike, and strangely it spread to Chinese nationalists themselves who also saw in Confucian values...
the source of China's decay and impotent responses to the West's continuing thrust into China, through wars, trade, and missions. In varying degrees Chinese leaders wanted to become like the West. Earlier patriots wanted to adopt only the branches of Western civilization while preserving the trunk of Chinese values. Later patriots, though, were filled with disdain for things Chinese and wanted all-out Westernization.

During this century of humiliation, from the Opium War to the Communist Revolution, China's star declined while that of the West rose. As they passed each other, China was anything but a mirror for the West. Our own images today of China are indeed rooted largely in this interlude between periods of Confucian and Maoist strength. The wars which mark this interlude were usually begun by Western nations as they forced their ideas of free trade and military control onto China. This holds true not only for England, France, Russia, and Germany, but for Japan, who has borrowed so much from China in the past, and also for the United States which has masked its own role in the innocuous sounding term of the "open door."

By the 1940s, when China was impotent under the Japanese occupation and U.S. influence with the Chinese government was high, China's weakness became proverbial. The phrase, "not a Chinaman's chance" was the metaphor for no chance at all. American GI's fighting on behalf of the Nationalist effort, thought the Chinese soldiers were simply incapable of fighting. After Japan's surrender in 1945, new hopes emerged that China might at last throw off its lethargy, reassert itself, and occupy a leading position in international relations. China shook the world.

But in shaking off the structures of humiliation under Communist leadership, China incurred the wrath of Western leaders. The Revolution and outside responses to it destroyed the Western connections, the missions, trade, and even diplomatic relations. The contempt built up over the previous century quickly turned to fear. A China which was ruled by a Communist Party spreading atheism through thought control campaigns and which was populated by over a half billion people who seemingly went along with that control, presented an ominous image. China had turned its back on U.S. "friendship." In the words of one Indiana congressman, "China wasn't grateful." The price of that ingratitude was the marshaling of U.S. military power for over two decades to contain and try to destroy the power of the awakened giant, as it was called.

The fear of China has been fed by the stories, many of them true, about the killing of landlords in land reform, thought reform campaigns, refugees spilling out into Hong Kong, the collectivization of agriculture, short experiments in separating families on the communes, and more recently the image of Red Guards roaming the country at will and waving little Red Books. Indeed, there is a stridency, an intellectual orthodoxy, and a disregard for the individual in the Chinese Revolution which many Westerners find simply revolting. The writer Barbara Tuchman, one of the more liberal voices among us generating understanding between Maoist China and the West today, has expressed this judgment in these words: "The most obvious negative in the process is the mental monotone imposed upon the country. All thought, all ideas past, present, and future, not to mention the historic record, are twisted, manipulated, rolled out, and flattened into one, expressed in half a dozen slogans dimmed incessantly and insistently into the heads of the public. As far as the life of the mind in China is concerned, its scope has rigid limits and its sound is a blaring, endlessly repeated single note." Tuchman expresses my own doubts about the new China.

Yet the China of today is a part of the broader human experience. If someone such as Richard Nixon, whose political career was built, in part, on exploiting this fear and hatred of China, can himself become the major force in opening windows to China, then those of us who make a profession out of looking into the mirrors of the past and of other societies, should be able to look at China with dispassion.

A former Methodist missionary in China and then Taiwan who is currently the director of the Midwest China Study Resource Center in St. Paul, Minnesota wrote after a visit to the People's Republic that the Chinese are a "picture of ruddy health." If 800 million Chinese, he said, living on the same land area as 200 million Americans can produce food, clothing and meet the basic needs of life, without foreign aid, and share them equitably with all their people, then "so can we, and so can the other people on Spaceship Earth." China, for him, is a symbol of hope, as it is for me. Its apparent ability to provide food, social welfare, and a sense of purpose is impressive indeed. Ironically Mao's hope was derived in part from his and China's recent experience with the West. A half century ago Western ideas, in contrast to the destructiveness of Western imperialism, offered hope to Chinese patriots. Now the tide is perhaps reversing.

Gone is the respect, built up over a half century, for Westernization, whether in education, clothing styles, or commerce. Anger, struggle, righteous indignation, and a passion for justice are the emotions. The Revolution elevated peasant qualities and virtues to unprecedented heights, and yet it has also taken on a Western-like commitment to the future and to the concept of progress. The Chinese ability, thus far, to combine these qualities defies much of our conventional wisdom about growth and development. How can a country like China with
such a huge population and such a small gross national
product do it? Where is the wealth and capital to work
with? Where is the outside aid? How can poor people
apparently be so happy?

One's understanding of happiness, to be sure, differs
from society to society. The expectations of U.S. students
may find very little in common with that of the farmers in
rural Szechuan. But one comparison may be meaningful,
namely preventive medicine and basic health care. Truly
noteworthy in China is the eradication of venereal
diseases, opium-smoking, smallpox, cholera, leprosy,
and schistosomiasis in a land that had become for us the
symbol of physical disease. In the 1960s Chinese factories
were providing medical care to their employees with their
own doctors, nurses, clinics, and sickbeds. With the help
of “barefoot doctors” in more recent years these services
have extended into the countryside. Progress could also
be cited in mental health, which appears to be a relatively
small problem, partially because sick people can be quite
easily reintegrated into a society where active partici-
pation in small groups, manual labor, and general skills
are the norm. Health care in China is not without
problems. Barefoot doctors lack sufficient training;
hospital facilities need to be expanded; and many cures
that we take for granted in the West are too expensive for
the Chinese. But the practice there is impressive
nonetheless in its ability to combine traditional medicine
with modern methods and to offer maximum care with
the minimum of material resources.

China’s health care program is a shocking mirror to
our own. There is no denying the great technological
strides we have made in the diagnosis and treatment of
diseases, but these benefits are a mixed blessing. The
spectacular discoveries are marred by the actual practice
of medicine which has become largely the private
enterprise of doctors and drug companies. By focusing on
curative methods for the rich, health care has turned into
a privilege rather than a right. In China venereal diseases
are unheard of, but here they have escalated to epidemic
proportions. Popular TV programs romanticize the
exotic and expensive sides of practice and provide us with
no hint that our own health care could be vastly improved
by access to the services that paramedics could provide
but which the profession jealously guards for itself.
Specialization, not general services, is the theme
dominating the requirements for success in our medical
schools.

Accompanying this lopsided development is inflation,
which has raised the cost of health care so sharply that the
cure is often a greater burden than the disease. Over the
past twenty years, Ivan Illich observes, the general price
index has risen by about seventy-five percent, while the
cost of medical care has risen 300 percent and community
and hospital costs some 500 percent. Life expectancy in
the United States is still considerably higher than in
China, and yet it is declining among American males. To
Illich the things we associate with progress may more
properly be called “medical nemesis.”

Behind these two patterns of health care lie funda-
mental differences in values. One area is the under-
standing of material progress. China’s leaders are as
committed to that ideal as we are, but they define it
somewhat differently. Ours is often understood in terms
of consumption, the accumulation of wealth, and the
preference for urban living. In China the simple tasks of
providing enough food, the control of floods, economic
decentralization, and stability are the marks of revolu-
tionary achievement. Shanghai was once a dirty and
dangerous city. Now it is perhaps the world’s safest—and
dullest—city. China’s advantage may be its poverty and
its huge population; its kind of economic necessity
may turn out to be a virtue. But poverty and expanding
populations alone are no guarantees of a society’s ability
to avoid the less desirable qualities of industrialized life,
as many poor nations in the world today would attest.

Another contrast with the West has been the interpre-
tation of the individual’s relationship to society. In
addition to material growth, progress in the West has
often been measured in terms of protecting individual
rights, private pursuits. We celebrate the Bill of Rights,
free enterprise, and the right to choose. China also
celebrates its Revolution as a liberation, but it is in class
terms, not individual terms. On its list of achievements
the guarantees of individual freedom, due process, and civil rights, are conspicuously lacking. One of the groups Westerners have not seen in their recent visits to China are lawyers. The theme running throughout the ideological campaigns over the last quarter of a century is the denunciation of individualism. This fact is appalling to Western minds, but it may not be so unpleasant in a society where Confucian values for centuries have emphasized the group over the individual. The slogan is "serve the people." It is an idea that is rooted in Confucian thought, caught the attention of Christian converts in China fifty years ago, and is expressed everywhere from lapel buttons to works of art. This theme of service is not unfamiliar in our own ways of thinking, but the idea that it might so pervade human relationships in a society as huge and complex as China stretches the credulity of even the most Sinophilic among us.

A third contrast between China and ourselves is the approach to economic production. As Marxists, the Chinese leadership today is strongly committed to industrialization and expanding production in ways that would disappoint the French physiocrats, to say nothing of Tolstoy. Factories have grown up largely around urban areas in the first decade after the Revolution, but more recently at the commune level far away from the cities, under the broad theme of decentralization. Millions of acres of land, denuded by decades of erosion prior to the Revolution, have been reforested, while massive irrigation projects occupy the labor of millions of workers in the slack seasons. Most villages now have electrification. As in the West these projects have had their toll—industrial pollution in the western suburbs of Peking has blocked off the view of the beautiful Western Hills to city residents, and onetime quiet valleys are now blighted with the noises of engines and electrical wires. But, compared to ourselves, Chinese society is highly decentralized and harmonious with nature. China’s scale of industrialization is so much smaller than ours. They balance agriculture and industry differently than we do. Workers in Chinese factories, for example, outproduce their country cousins seven to one, but their average cash wages are only about three times as large. If China merely wanted to create material wealth, the leaders, following Western notions of optimization, should encourage the growth of industry at the expense of agriculture. But they don’t. In fact migration today is away from the cities, back to the countryside. Shanghai today is smaller than it was ten years ago. Along with industrialization China has mechanized some of the means of production, but machines have not replaced human labor. To jaded eyes, people and tractors pulling loads on the same road may be odd, perhaps ridiculous, certainly inefficient. But to other eyes, the Chinese pattern may provide some clue to a better balance between people and machines and between conservation and development.

Finally, China’s future orientation is almost a mockery of the Confucian obsession with the past. And yet the past is not forgotten. Archeology is flourishing. Ideological campaigns are waged with words, themes and analogies from the Han dynasty. The Chinese today are still very conscious of their history, albeit a different history from that written by the Confucian literati. The traditional arts and crafts have not been forgotten, despite the inroads of socialist realism. Jade carving continues with an excellence comparable to before, while recent landscape paintings are ideological largely in their titles. China may also offer some clues to a balance between tradition and modernity, past and present.

In short, as we look for hope, we may find some inspiration in China today. But we should not look too long or too hard. In the first half of this century Chinese leaders turned almost indiscriminately to the West for their inspiration. The Western-educated, the converts to Christianity, the Moscow-trained, and the Nationalist leadership often failed to see that China had resources of its own. Western admirers of China should not make the same mistake. The Chinese Revolution is not for export.

But I disagree with those who would say that China’s experience has nothing to offer us. A mere glance is sometimes enough to expose the errors of thinking that our well-being is conditioned on another car, thicker rugs, larger houses, more academic degrees, greater mobility and other expressions of our ideologies of growth. Heilbroner foresees a “radically different future” for humankind, in which the “present orientation of society must change,” where the “long established encouragement of industrial production” must diminish, and where “new frugal attitudes” must replace the “prodigalities of consumption.” Furthermore, he believes that our survival may be possible only “under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively than would be possible in a democratic setting.” China may help us define a more workable relationship between wealth and progress and between the individual and society.

To sophisticated eyes, China’s art may appear to be too simple, too strident. Its celebration of hope may appear shallow. But it portrays a people with faces, with bodies that are not twisted and misshapen. The grotesque and the despairing are not praised. There are genuine heroes. In the art, people are seen working together. An inquiry into the human prospect may be a pessimistic one if it is understood only within the confines of our recent experience in the West. But when our sights are broadened to include China, the prospect may be a more happy one.
During late August of this year, Friends Journal interviewed Richard Bush, Program Associate for the China Council of the Asia Society. Dr. Bush holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, and was quite helpful in supplying information about recent political and cultural developments in China. Since the death of Chairman Mao, China has experienced an accelerated rate of change, and we are grateful to Dr. Bush for providing us with an overview of some of those changes.

What has been the history of rapprochement between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China?
The process began in the late 1960s with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The USSR rationalized the invasion on the grounds that it could intervene militarily in a "fraternal Socialist country" if it was necessary to stop a serious "deviation," and China's leaders quickly realized that such a principle could be turned against their country, still in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. The gradual warming of relations with the U.S. began at that point, partly in response to Richard Nixon's apparent willingness to deal with China on a new basis.

The turn towards the U.S. generated substantial conflict in China. Lin Piao, then China's Defense Minister and heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung, believed that China should continue to pursue a "dual adversary strategy," equidistant from the USSR and the U.S. Premier Chou En-lai, drawing on thirty years of diplomatic experience, believed that the time had come for China to build bridges to the U.S. and other countries opposed to Soviet expansion. Chou won out over Lin in a struggle over policy and position, and the latter died in a plane crash after allegedly plotting to kill Mao.

Up until that time (1971), China had consistently held that a solution of the Taiwan question had to precede improvement of Sino-American relations. Richard Nixon travelled to China after Mao and Chou reversed themselves on that issue. Meanwhile, the elaboration of a common approach towards the Soviet Union, the opening up of trade ties between the U.S. and China, the beginning of cultural and scientific people-to-people exchanges would all take priority over the Taiwan question which was expected to be solved fairly soon, thus normalizing Sino-American relations. That was not to be the case.

Due to Watergate?
Due to Watergate; due to increasing political conflict within China; due to the victory of the Communists in
Vietnam. As a result, neither side was able to pay the domestic political prices that compromise demanded. Since the beginning of the Carter Administration, there has been a gradual movement towards resolution of the Taiwan problem, completing the process begun in 1969, which was codified in the Shanghai Communique, the document that completed the Nixon visit to China in 1972. At this point, Sino-American relations involve two major issues. First is the Taiwan question. Second is how seriously, in China's eyes, the U.S. is taking an anti-Soviet posture in its foreign policy. The differing views in U.S. academic and political circles on the relative importance of these two issues are the dividing factors in the political debate within the U.S.

The policy of seeking technical assistance from the U.S. in modernizing China seems to be tied to a desire to prepare for a possible military conflict with the Soviet Union. Can we build friendship with China without "heating up the Cold War" with Russia?

I have several reactions. One is that most of the technology which China may purchase is of an economic or industrial nature, especially in the realm of oil drilling, computers, transportation equipment and other types of advanced technology.

Some of the technology can be used for both civilian and military purposes?

Yes, possibly. This is a very complicated issue, on which there is a range of opinion. At present, it's the U.S. policy not to make direct sales of military equipment to China. We do, at the same time, have control over the sales that our allies might make to China of military equipment which has U.S. components, and have occasionally approved such sales. It is thought in some circles that, while the sale of military technology to China, whether direct or indirect, might be seen as creating a greater possibility of war between China and the Soviet Union, the U.S. is in the position to be rather selective in the types of military technology it transfers or allows to be transferred to China. People with this opinion suggest that if the U.S. was to make technology that was defensive in nature available to China, that would allow China better to defend itself against the Soviet Union. And this would actually stabilize the situation on China's northern border, making a contribution to world peace. An example would be anti-tank weapons.

Now, there's an interesting change in the Chinese formulation of world politics: up until the end of last year, it had been the Chinese position that war was inevitable.

War with the Soviet Union?

War with the Soviet Union, or war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Global war, in essence. Their position was that the conflict between the Soviet Union and all the forces arrayed against it was too deep to be avoided.

And Now?

The position is that war, global war, will occur sometime in the future, but it can be delayed, that there are ways of creating obstacles to the development of war. And this is, although it seems that there is only a slight verbal change, quite a significant modification of their position. Furthermore, the Chinese are specific on how to set up those obstacles. It requires, they say, a coalition of China, the U.S., Japan, the countries of Western Europe and the Third World to oppose Soviet expansionism in various parts of the world: Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe.

A number of Friends and others are quite involved in scientific and alternative technology pursuits. What opportunities do you see for cooperation?

One of the provisions of the Shanghai Communique was that the U.S. and China should begin scientific exchanges. An organization was set up, under the aegis of the National Academy of Sciences: the "Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China." It has acted as the funnel for that scientific exchange. Delegations have been going back and forth for several years.

To what extent is this now possible in a way that it wasn't before?

Since the purge of the so-called Gang of Four in late 1976, and especially since the Chinese National Science Conference in March of 1978, where a firm stamp was put on the need to develop science, there's been more openness. Scientific exchange takes place on different levels. There are the official exchanges, which began in July with a delegation of science administrators led by the President's national science advisor. There are the facilitated exchanges which take place under the aegis of the Committee on Scholarly Communication and the National Committee for U.S.-China Trade. Of growing importance are groups of scientists who go under less official auspices. In 1977, for example, a group of scientists from Rockefeller University went and toured various science institutions. At the next level is a lot of individual contact, especially among Chinese-American scientists. Beyond that is the exchange, not of people, but of information. The Chinese do subscribe to and very carefully read U.S. scientific journals. In fact, they read and digest them so quickly that sometimes scientists who go to China on a trip find their Chinese counterparts have read the latest issue before they have and immediately have questions. Groups of scientists who are interested in furthering this cooperation can make contact with organizations like the Committee for Scholarly Communication and make their interest known to be selected to go on a trip. It's also possible to try to put together one's own group, make contact with the Chinese International Travel Service and see what the response is.

How much encouragement is there of Overseas Chinese
to visit, study, work and contribute money?
Again here has been, on the official policy level, quite a change in just the past six months. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese government encouraged Overseas Chinese to come back to China to employ their talents in the building of socialism, to send money that could be invested in enterprises. It was possible for students to go back to China to study, and there were many cases of this. However, with the coming of the Cultural Revolution, that openness to contact ended, and there was a concern for security of the state. It became more difficult for people to send money and know that it was being invested. People who wanted to come back were suspected of being spies. Even people in China who had relatives overseas were under fairly constant suspicion. Before the Cultural Revolution, there were special privileges established for Overseas Chinese and for families in China who had members overseas. They had special banking arrangements, special stores with more consumer goods. These were shut down as a kind of elitism. At present, there has been turn-around in this set of policies, and Overseas Chinese are again welcome to return. There is a new openness to investment because China is looking for all the investment capital it can find for the modernization effort, there is a recognition that local level cadres had discriminated against families who had overseas members. There has been a recent indication that some of the former special privileges have been restored. Hua Chao University has been reopened and it’s possible for students from Hong Kong to come to China to advance their studies.

A couple of problems remain. One is that the suspicious point of view still may exist in a lot of local governments and a possibility of discrimination still exists. The other problem is the situation in Vietnam, where China has had, all of a sudden, to take on over 100,000 new citizens and relocate them and find work for them, which has been a very difficult task. They have to provide at least some kind of protection for these Chinese in Vietnam to show other Overseas Chinese in other places that they’re serious. On the other hand, they can’t threaten relations with other countries in Southeast Asia by supporting the Chinese too much.

Do you see an increase in consumerism in China now?
We have discovered in the last few years that there’s a lot of pent-up consumer demand in China, that people have substantial savings and would like to spend it on things. The problem is the volume and quality of goods. It’s a problem that occurred in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. There are various kinds of rationing systems in effect to deal with this excessive demand over supply.

Some progress is being made. For example, I recently returned from China with a group of tourists. We had some retired retailers in our group who wanted to see how the Chinese did it. We were most impressed with the fact that Chinese department stores seemed to be crowded with people: people looking to buy things, people actually buying things, people had money to spend, and there were goods for them to purchase. People in the cities, at least, are getting away from the drab fashions that have been the trademark. People, especially young people, are more interested in wearing colorful clothes, as opposed to gray or blue which we’re used to seeing. I think that consumer demand will still be restricted for awhile, because the emphasis seems to be on development of heavy industry and secondary attention to expansion of the light industry.

What about women’s liberation?
The major progress has been a long-term one, over the last thirty years, one in which the Cultural Revolution and the Campaign to Criticize Confucius played a major role. One is struck, in visits to China, with the confidence with which women carry themselves. In the area of social change, of changing family relations, in changing women’s access to work and in changing social attitudes about women, there’s been a great deal of change. But I don’t think we can say that that broader social and economic change has spilled over into the area of politics especially above the local level.

What do you see regarding the future of the family in China?
As an institution, the family—a nuclear or near-nuclear family—is one of the best things that China has going for it. In the proper environment the Chinese family always has been one of the strengths of Chinese society. It instills the values of discipline and hard work that the political system only reinforces. It has adapted remarkably well to the coming of socialism.

Is the divorce rate lower?
The divorce rate is much lower. China is better equipped to handle these sorts of problems than we are, because the wider community in which a person moves and lives, either the work unit in the city or the production team in the countryside, sees it as its collective responsibility to try to help family members in conflict work out their problems.

What evidence is there that China’s population growth rate has reached an optimum level and stabilized?
China’s population is still growing at a fairly fast rate, but there’s been a good bit of success in reducing the number of births in places where political control and organization is quite dense. I’m referring especially to cities and suburban communes. But the degree of compliance with the birth control policies further out in the countryside is much less. Political organization is not as effective, and, frankly, the incentives in the agricultural system still encourage large families and the birth of
males. There is not a universal social security system in the countryside, so parents have to depend on their children to take care of them in their old age. Since they still lose daughters in marriage, they have to rely on sons.

The problem behind the population problem, the production of food to meet at least the subsistence needs of the population, is still undecided. China is still in a race between the growth of population and the growth of food, but compared to other Third World countries with population problems, China is very much ahead.

What about China's policy regarding human rights? Has the number of prisoners increased or decreased since the death of Chairman Mao?

This whole area is very complex—data is limited, standards are confused, the proper relation to our foreign policy is debatable. I can make a few personal observations. First, to answer your specific question: we don't know. There seem to be a number of people released from supervision born of political mistakes, but we have no idea how many might be replacing them. Second, it seems clear that the Chinese leadership is making an effort to make the Chinese criminal justice system more predictable. Some trials have been opened to the public, and trial procedures—not the Bill of Rights by any means—have been reinstated. As a result, citizens may have more guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of state power by local authorities. Third, China has accepted certain basic standards of conduct. In the UN, they have joined other countries in opposing torture. For several years, emigration for the unification of families has been allowed, and Senator Kennedy encouraged an expansion of the flow during his trip at the beginning of the year. Fourth, we do have to recognize that the boundaries of choice within which Chinese people move are very different from our system. Economic equality is greater; living standards are less. Civil liberties are fewer; the support of social institutions for their members seems greater. Social mobility is quite limited, especially for youth; a sense of personal security seems fairly high. Participation by the masses in national policy formation and leadership selection is minimal; in local affairs, often quite significant. In brief, it's a very different system with different priorities; arriving at an overall evaluation is difficult indeed.

According to the Chinese constitution, there is freedom of belief, but the only ones who have the freedom to "propagate their faith" are the Communists. Is this changeable?

No, I don't think so. The only variation in that policy has been how much freedom is given to people to practice their religion openly. There are times when there's been a little more freedom; times when Chinese Christians, for example, feel safe in going to church, as opposed to having services in their homes; times when there's kind of a relaxation regarding religious practices in the countryside. But then, in times of political tension, there's a clamp-down and it becomes quickly obvious to people that they'd be in broader trouble if they tried to openly practice their religion.

I found evidence during my recent trip of both the persistence of traditional religious beliefs and the government's more relaxed approach to them. The person in charge of a Taoist temple outside of Canton that is kept open as a sort of "cultural relic" told me that people in both city and countryside continue to carry Taoist beliefs around in their heads. "These kinds of superstitions," he said, "evolved over a period of several millennia, and cannot be eradicated in three decades." Doing so will require a long period of education to show the superiority of a materialist ideology.

Where are the Chinese in terms of nuclear power?
The primary nuclear development is for national defense. The Chinese have begun a preliminary investigation of the possibilities of civilian use, but it is not likely to become a significant energy source.

In terms of learning from some of our problems in this area there's a real chance for sharing?

Yes. I think that we have faced a number of problems already that they're pushing towards and they have the

A statue of Mao Tse-tung as a young man is located in front of the building where he was educated.
advantage of coming after us. We are the head of the capitalist world, and some Chinese have believed when learning from the capitalist world, it is difficult—even impossible—to separate out the system from the specific lesson in a specific field. But right now a contrary approach is dominant: that is, China has much to learn from the United States and other advanced countries, especially in the fields of science and technology. Moreover, those lessons can be adapted to Chinese circumstances without unduly straining the fiber of Chinese society.

What do you feel we in the U.S. can learn from China?

I guess there are three areas of the contemporary Chinese experience that I find provocative for our own society. The first is the centralized setting of social goals. The center sets the goals and then makes every effort to secure compliance, through both administrative and ideological means. Ours is very much a pluralistic system, with a multitude of institutions pursuing their own goals. There are obvious problems with the Chinese approach, and obvious safeguards in our own system. But the degree to which Chinese appear to be committed to national purposes is something I find missing in our own society.

It's said that China has opted mainly for equality rather than the kind of freedom that is pursued in this country. I agree that they haven't opted for freedom, but I'm not sure they've opted for equality right away. It is still a highly structured, hierarchical society.

Wouldn't you say they have a lot more equality than we do?

Yes, in terms of wealth and income, in terms of satisfying basic needs. But equality can be measured on different variables. In terms of political power and influence, and access to decision-making, substantial inequality remains. Rectifying that situation is a problem for the future.

A second thing we can learn from China, especially in our desire for progress in the Third World, is the approach to a number of social problems. Health care is an example: China has managed to provide basic care for most or all of its people. In addition to solving specific problems, I think we can all learn something from the confidence of China's leaders that social and economic problems can be solved by political means. The Chinese experience of bureaucratic management is worth studying, both for its accomplishments and its problems.

A third aspect is the attention given to maintaining social institutions especially at the basic level. Families, neighborhood groups, and work units take positive steps to socialize and nurture their members, and intervene when conflict occurs. That collective conscience is something that America seems to have lost on its way into the modern world. I hope China doesn't lose it too. 

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**On the Liberation of Chinese Women**

by Katherine Ch'iu and Ned Lyle

The Confucian saying that "only women and inferior men (slaves) are difficult to get along with: they get out of hand when befriended and they resent it when kept at a distance" is quite expressive of the status of Chinese women historically. In the feudal system, men were generally subjected to the domination of three authorities: political, clan, and religious. Women, in addition to being dominated by these three authorities, were also dominated by men.

The impact of foreign invasion, economic control, and industrialization in the late nineteenth century diminished the authority of the father and husband. Christianity, with its emphasis on the education of women, opposition to footbinding, and support for a general improvement in women's social status, helped to catalyze ideas for change and articulate female discontent. However, Christianity was too bound up with the Western invasion of China to be perceived by most Chinese as a radicalizing force. But Christian ideology did raise the general consciousness of women and prepare them for emancipation.

During the early twentieth century, the Nationalists were torn in their approach to women's rights. They needed the support of feminists, but many of the women's demands were considered too radical. In fact, the Nationalist code, passed in 1931 in the midst of the New Life Movement, caused a general retrenchment of the women's movement. Elizabeth Croll of England said of the Nationalists, "They advanced a new ideal of womanhood which reinforced the traditional roles of wife and mother, re-emphasized Confucian virtues and established a new cult of domesticity."

By comparison, the women in the liberated northwest provinces were basically composed of economically deprived and oppressed peasant women. They were drawn into the labor force by necessity during the war against the Japanese. The participation of these women in economically productive activities forced an inevitable

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redefinition of their economic role and elevated their status in the family, as well as in the local community. With encouragement from the Communists’ ideology regarding the emancipation of women, they gained collective strength. Due partly to this increasingly symbiotic relationship, by the end of the Sino-Japanese War, it was evident that there was widespread sympathy for the Communists in the cities as well as in the countryside.

Since the victory of the Communists in 1949, the women’s liberation movement has been aided by land reform, the new marriage law, collectivization drives, the formation of communes, and other special programs which have a more direct relation to the women’s movement, such as the planned-birth campaign, and the language reform and literacy movement.

The redistribution of land in every village was fairly complete by 1952. The peasants became freeholders of what they had, whereas the landlords’ houses and fields were confiscated and redistributed among landless families. About 100 million acres changed hands. The benefits of land reform did not lead to economic revolution, as production patterns in the village did not alter fundamentally. But as a social revolution, land reform succeeded in destroying the feudal system of social stratification in the rural areas. It had both real and symbolic implications for the status of women. Women were no longer dependent on men, as they became equal holders of the land, and therefore shared as co-partners in the growth and development of the nation. The relationship between the overturning of the landlord class and the growth of the women’s movement was explained in *China Reconstructs* (March 1973):

> Every poor peasant, man or woman was allotted a piece of land in the land reform. To emphasize the fact the women had economic equality with men, we gave each woman a land certificate in her own name or wrote her name alongside her husband’s on one certificate. Before, women had always been referred to by others as “so-and-so’s wife” or “so-and-so’s mother.” Now for the first time in their lives many women heard their own names spoken in public.

Land reform had a direct impact on the internal structure of the family, which gave the young and the women an unprecedented sense of importance. It also marked the end of clan control, establishing non-familial group inter-
The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements and the supremacy of man over woman, and in disregard of the interests of the children, is abolished. The new-democratic marriage system, which is based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the protection of the lawful interests of women and children, is put into effect.

This law shattered the traditional family structure and ended the dominion of men over women in China. Husband and wife now equally hold the right to free choice of occupation and participation in work or social activities, possessing equal property rights. Divorce is granted when either wife or husband desire it.

Although women in China were granted constitutional equality, putting the law into practice sometimes engendered bitter opposition. Incidents were reported of women activists being murdered, and of suicide being committed by concubines who suddenly found themselves without anyone to support them after being ejected from households. Some cadres over-energetically enforced the marriage law, causing the issuance of a governmental directive stating that the law differed from the land reform edict and was to be put into effect with a minimum of force. Facing contradictory circumstances in some areas, the mass campaign to carry out the new marriage law was brought to a halt, not resuming momentum until 1953. It was discovered that old habits and ideas relating to both marriage and family were even harder to eliminate than had been expected.

Despite constitutional changes, women still found themselves economically dependent on men. With eighty percent of China's population rural and with limited land resources, excessive fragmentation of the land was economically unviable. A trend towards social ownership was inevitable. Since 1955, rural people's cooperatives and communes offered women employment opportunities and provided a system of social security and economic independence for them. All accrued incomes are paid in cash or kind to the contributing members of each team, female as well as male (as individuals not as a family unit). This contrasts greatly with the previous practice of paying the father-in-law of the wife. With the advent of women as individual wage earners, each woman could contribute her share of the earnings to the total family income, resulting in a great increase in respect for young women. Also, communes provided a truly social environment with collective services and welfare facilities (e.g., communal dining rooms, nurseries, old age homes) which freed women from household drudgery and enabled them to participate in social and political life. In 1958, women accounted for fifty percent of the labor force in agricultural areas. However, sexual division of labor was evident in the differentiation of jobs as "male work" and "female work." While "male work" was accorded a maximum of ten workpoints, "female work" was accorded six to seven workpoints. Even women doing the same jobs as men were receiving fewer workpoints.

Within the social setting of the communes, women's problems were recognized and specific programs were initiated, such as the planned-birth campaign. For the first time, Chinese women were in a situation where sex could be separated from reproduction. The traditional attitude toward the maternal sexual role of women gradually gave way to the new view of women as part of the productive labor force. However, the Chinese Communists rejected control of population growth as a substitute for social change. Instead, birth control was included in the regular health care system as part of maternal health and childcare. What is meant in China by the term "maternal health" is child spacing, not having too many children too early, which serves to foster the psychological health and morale of women working in the commune or neighborhood committee and also enables them to enjoy greater opportunities for employment and education. Birth planning has been achieved through a wide variety of contraceptive methods and a general acceptance of the delayed marriage approach to fertility control. Delayed marriage also makes possible the fulfillment of more educational and vocational work objectives for the woman, while resulting in happier and healthier family environments. The communal educational influence has spelled the breakdown of the extended family system and permitted the movement of women outside immediate family surroundings. The striking absence of almost all the sexual stimuli prevailing in the West (such as found in movies, advertisements, styles of clothing, etc.) has made delayed marriage and other related measures possible.

China is the country with the oldest continuous living written language on earth. While the language is known to be concise and powerful, it is also unwieldy to master. The effect of China's language and traditional social policies has been to keep most Chinese illiterate, thus rendering them incapable of changing their social status. The etymology of certain words in the language conveys the force of traditional social patterns. For example, in Birdless Summer, Han Suyin writes:

The very ideogram for "woman" (女) denoted subjection, the bar across, horizontal burden of her heavy breasts, the protuberant hips and the crossed bow legs, not quite quadrupedal, but almost. Since then I have often thought that in today's China,
with the Cultural Revolution which compels all to weigh in the light of reason our secret clannings to primeval devices of subjection, the first thing that should be done is to eradicate totally, to change totally, some of those odious ideograms which are exact pictures of two millennia of feudal oligarchy, four millennia of women’s inferiority.

After the promulgation of the new marriage law, literacy and technical education among women was greatly stressed. Classes were organized in the rural areas as well as in cities. Kindergarten and primary school children were taught to read in the schools and then sent home to teach their parents and grandparents. Members of the People’s Liberation Army helped teach the peasants to read; each peasant then wore a Chinese character on his or her back for the peasant working behind her or him in the fields to learn.

Today, the literacy rate approaches eighty-five percent, and has had a direct impact upon the emancipation of all the Chinese people. Through increased literacy, women have begun to think independently of men. With increased access to the written word, they have begun to examine and critically evaluate their traditional roles. They view themselves as active agents of social change.

The Cultural Revolution stressed the political liberation of women as well as that of the broad masses. It sought to shake up the entrenched power structure, which, if not overturned, might allow the resumption of class exploitation and oppression. Women were encouraged to engage in study groups and small group political activities, and also urged to participate in the organization of urban street committees which, in turn, formed nurseries, dining halls, and small factories providing employment for women.

The course of the Chinese Revolution suggests that the cause of women’s emancipation is advanced when broad popular participation takes place. When economic goals are stressed, political activities are subordinated to production, and women’s emancipation is also subordinated. However, Mao’s concern was to ensure that the “superstructure” of Chinese society, and the quality of the human beings composing it, did not lag behind the economic base. “To look at things and not people,” Mao was quoted as saying early in 1963, “is to do an ineffective job.” That is what the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was all about. China, during the Cultural Revolution was prepared to sacrifice any measure of economic efficiency in order to maintain the impetus of these revolutionary social changes. The Chinese consider women’s emancipation as an integral part (not a separate “women’s” problem) of the whole political and economic development which will aid in the movement towards a socialist and classless society.

One of the more intriguing aspects of Chinese life is the radical emphasis upon certain moral values and the determination of the Chinese Communist Party to put these values into practice on a nationwide basis. An example is the decision by Mao Tse-tung and his followers during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the years 1966 to 1969 to include a work project in the schooling of every child, at every grade level from kindergarten up. In Kwangchau, I saw kindergarteners tending a vegetable garden; in Tsinan, elementary school children making the component parts for insect spray cans; in Shanghai, high schoolers working in a simple machine shop. Young people aspiring to go to a university must put in two years of work in the countryside after completion of high school.

Here one sees in operation on a grand, prescribed scale that involves millions of children, some of the same egalitarian principles that motivate Quaker work camps and service projects: identification with manual laborers and learning from participation in work. Furthermore, the attitude of the average Chinese educated person in working with peasants (not a pejorative term in China) or for that matter, being assigned permanently to jobs in rural areas, is reminiscent of the idealism that conscripted young Friends manifested as conscientious objectors in Civilian Public Service during the first years of the Second World War.

I have referred to moral values advisedly because “religion” as such has been a casualty of the Chinese Revolution. In 1949, there were in China four million Christians, less than one percent of the population. China’s churches were dominated by foreign missionaries, whom many Chinese patriots had for decades associated with imperialism, despite the excellence of Christian programs.

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in the fields of education and medicine. Official policy after the Revolution in 1949 permitted freedom of worship, as well as freedom not to worship, but there were ideological objections to religion and tremendous pressures against those engaging in religious activities. Finally, during the Cultural Revolution, remaining churches were attacked by young Red Guards. I saw the former Lutheran Church in Tsingtao with its tall spires, but without a cross, being used as a warehouse. The fate of Buddhism in China has been the same. A visit to a Buddhist temple revealed only a caretaker, no resident monks.

Father William Van Etten Casey, editor of The Holy Cross Quarterly, who like myself, visited China for three weeks, writes: "The new Chinese people do not have a monopoly on virtue, but certainly, of all the peoples of the world whom I have seen, they are easily outstanding for the abundance of their virtues and the absence of the more usual vices." A traveler finds Chinese people friendly, courteous, cheerful, patient, serene, confident, industrious, thrifty, dedicated, disciplined, self-possessed and trustworthy. The style of life is clearly puritanical. The treatment of children appears to be tender and loving. Marriage and the family are strong social institutions.

As a Jesuit priest, Casey asks, how do you "account for so numerous a people engaging in such a widespread practice of virtues which in the West have been traditionally associated with religious belief and religious motivation?" He sees the nations of the West, with religion, "sick from overdoses of violence, greed, injustice, selfishness, prejudice, pornography, crime, drugs, and weapons, but China, without religion, producing a healthy and virtuous people." John Fairbank and other students of China point out that there are significant continuities between the old China and the new. Both traditional China and Communist China have stressed the role of ideology. Chinese thinkers of all major schools have stressed the innate goodness and moral sense of persons. As with Friends, humanity is perfectible. The ancient Chinese stress on the moral educability of persons is clearly evident in China today.

The Confucian tradition is humanistic, without a religious base. Chinese life was marked and seems to be marked today by concern for propriety. The individual acknowledges the strength of social objectives and subordinates himself or herself to them. The individual as such is not exalted. Personal dignity and virtue derive from right conduct. The acts of a person are to be judged by their contribution to social welfare and stability.

Traditionally, rulers were supposed to govern "by goodness," providing wise and benevolent leadership (although many did not). Despite the downgrading of Confucius by Chinese Communists because of his advocacy of an elitist form of government, the ideas of bureaucratic government, right conduct and subordination of the individual have obviously been accepted. There is a large-scale centralized administration in China, based on the Leninist system of party dictatorship, but until the most recent directives of the Party under the chairmanship of Hua Kuo-feng, there has been widespread political participation by Chinese through street or neighborhood committees, factory and commune revolutionary (management) committees, small political study groups, and mass organizations.

In the briefings that the tour group with which I traveled had in factories, schools and production brigades (units of a commune), we were constantly aware of the importance of ideology, of the ideas being championed by the Party. We were visiting during what might be considered a post-Cultural Revolution period. During that Revolution, intellectuals, artists, Party bureaucrats, and former members of the landlord class were attacked by young Red Guards. These young people were encouraged by Mao Tse-tung to eradicate "bourgeois reaction-
ary thinking” and to campaign against the pragmatists. The Cultural Revolution, therefore, is part of the background for the denunciation of the “Gang of Four,” including Mao’s wife, who had spearheaded the complete politicization of literature and the arts ten years ago. Now, under the leadership of Hua Kuo-feng, new Chairman of the Communist Party, the pragmatists have won out over the Maoists. At every briefing our group heard the “Gang of Four” virulently condemned, and we were told that “all the people support Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and the Central Committee.”

In a visit of three weeks there was no way, even if the language barrier could have been surmounted, to determine the private thoughts and feelings of the Chinese with whom we talked. As Klaus Menhert, a sympathetic German observer of China, has pointed out, “the man of the Far East has been taught by life, to a degree unknown to the European or American, not to wear his thoughts or feelings on his face or to betray them with his tongue.” But plainly evident are the discipline of the people, the willingness to work hard, the absorption in a great national effort and the consequent submergence of individual preferences and goals. Incredibly, employment is on the basis of assignment, with young people from cities, for example, being assigned to remote rural areas in order to build up underdeveloped regions and to stop urban growth.

The human rights about which we in the U.S. are most concerned—freedom of speech and of assembly, the democratic style of political participation, and institutions that aim at “a government of laws and not of men”—are not emphasized in China. We must recall that China was, at the time of the Revolution, grossly underdeveloped and is still today what our Chinese hosts frequently characterized as a “poor country.” In 1949, there was a high percentage of illiteracy, a very limited number of schools and hospitals, abject poverty among the vast majority of families, and widespread prostitution, crime, and addiction to opium.

Today eighty percent of the population is literate. There is no hunger or malnutrition, a remarkable comprehensive health system has been developed, and there is new housing everywhere. Population growth is being successfully stemmed. China, with an estimated 800 million people, is largely a self-reliant nation. There is new meaning and hope in the lives of great masses of Chinese people. In other words, some very basic human rights have been secured.

China’s progress as a developing country is a challenge to other developing countries. But I am also interested in the moral challenge to Westerners and, more especially, to Friends. Positive ethical features of Chinese society are simple, indeed Spartan, living, including unpretentious clothing; hard work and plain living; honesty (lost articles were regularly returned to tour group members); the preference for persuasion and education in conflicts between individuals or groups, using “criticism, struggle and transformation”; egalitarianism in income and styles of living; concern for the welfare of others (“serve the people”); and reverence for life, as exemplified particularly in the priority given public health measures and medical care for everyone.

On the other hand, it is clearly difficult, for Friends at least, to accept the overriding priority that is given to politics and the consequent all-pervasive pressure upon individuals from official sources. Such a priority, as William Barton has pointed out in his 1966 Swarthmore Lecture, The Moral Challenge of Communism, “leaves insufficient place for personal moral decision, for unorthodox individual conscience, or for the positive contribution of minority views.” There is no acceptance of a cluster of Quaker values, including the religious practice of seeking the Light, openness to truth, and liberty of conscience. In briefing after briefing on our tour, and in press releases, I was struck by the compromising terms of right and wrong that were used and the advocacy of hate and irreconcilability towards political opponents at home and abroad, notably the “Gang of Four” and the Russians. This attitude reflects an absolutism similar to what some evangelical Christians or other religious groups also hold.

It would be foolish to write off China because it does not have a democratic style of government and because the Chinese society pays insufficient attention, from our point of view, to the individual as an end in herself or himself. The accomplishments and the positive values of China are relevant to the West, but even more relevant to the hundreds of millions of persons in the world who seek the primary human rights of bread, health, shelter, and hope. We as U.S. citizens and Friends would do well to look carefully at the positive, rather than the negative, aspects of Chinese society and, as John Woolman said, to see if we “might receive some instruction from them,” both in respect to our own country and in reference to Third World countries.
THE LITERATURE OF DISSERT
by Adam Daniel Finnerty

The speaker was a young black man from Philadelphia. Seven short days ago he had been a delighted visitor in the People's Republic of China. Now he was back to tell his story.

His line of work was early childhood education—a field that, like many others these days, is suffering from lack of money. Because he worked in the poor sections of the city, and because he worked with minority children—children who suffer twice over in our unequal and caste-ridden society—he was doubly impressed by what he saw in his month of touring. The children were happy; the teachers were smiling and totally committed; the parents were eager to help in any way they could. The signs of massive social commitment to youth were everywhere.

What a contrast to the United States! No wonder, then, that this young man would return filled with excitement and praise. No wonder that any doubting views would be dismissed by him out of hand. What about freedom, he imagined some sceptic in the audience inquiring? His response: "People in America have more freedom than people in China. But people in America have the right to do what is right—or what is wrong. People in China have only one choice—to do what is right."

It must be comforting to think that there is a land somewhere on this strife-torn planet on which the people are always happy and the leadership always helps them do only what is "right." It must be nice to feel that there is a country where only really bad people are ever punished—and even their punishment is limited to "severe criticism" in the expectation that they will "reform." It must be wonderful to believe that—as the audience was told during the day-long seminar at which this teacher was a speaker—there is a nation whose chief criterion in the conduct of foreign policy is international "solidarity" with the poor and oppressed of the world, rather than selfish national interest.

Unfortunately—and I say this with real regret—China is not that country. And this isn't just my opinion, or the opinion of some right-wing scholar in the pay of Taiwan—it is the opinion of thousands and millions of China's own people.

There is dissent in China today. There is opposition. There is even what might be called a "human rights" movement. Friends of China no longer have to feel hampered by the supposed "lack of information" about the reality of the mainland. Since the Cultural Revolution, "inside" views of China have been pouring across the borders. China is opening up, and in the process of its doing so, we are discovering that it isn't the perfect land of happy revolutionaries that we may once have thought.

Don't get me wrong. China is not a nightmare either. Its gains are many, the changes have been revolutionary and profound, its potential contribution to the rest of the world is immense. But it isn't perfect.

American views of China have changed dramatically in the last five years. Many of us remember that it wasn't so long ago when China was officially portrayed as part of a massive Communist movement, bent on destroying the "free" world and "enslaving" its people. As one Chinese scholar put it, "The public image of China was altogether portrayed in lurid primary colors: a red nation of blue ants programmed to sweep over the world like a yellow peril."

Then it all changed. Richard Nixon, a man who had built his career on anti-communism, did a complete volte-face by personally extending the hand of friendship to that archrevolutionary, Chairman Mao. Then, as he tells us in his Memoirs, Nixon had a warm chat with the Chairman, assuring him that he (Nixon) sincerely admired Mao's "great" leadership of the Chinese people.

Meanwhile, the people of the U.S.—who are constantly subjected to trash and litter in their parks and their cities—were shown on television that in China even the snowflakes are swept off the street (at least when U.S. Presidents come for a visit).

Since the Nixon visit, the U.S. media has carried a moderate but steady stream of stories about this "miracle" or that "spectacular achievement" in China. Professors, politicians, workers, and teachers steadily return from China, all with remarkable tales of joy and progress. At the same time, many young and old members of the U.S. "left" have been looking to China for years as a source of hope and inspiration. For many of these people, the words of Chairman Mao—and especially the Cultural Revolution—have struck a resounding note. Thus, both the "left" and the "middle" in the U.S. have come to think of China as a very remarkable society.

For example, Thomas Gates is an almost total opposite to the black school teacher who just returned from
China, White, wealthy, a man with powerful friends, Mr. Gates was chosen to be the head of the U.S. mission to China under President Ford. He returned, full of praise for "the extraordinary discipline" of the Chinese people, and assured a group of University of Pennsylvania alumni that:

There is no inflation, there is no unemployment, there is no crime; there's no drugs, prostitutes, or beggars. . . . No one is hungry. . . . I really think these people believe in what they're doing and have a kind of religion or creed created by Chairman Mao that holds them together in common interest.

Yet how seriously should we take these visitors to China? Neither Gates nor the school teacher speak Chinese. Even if they had, their itinerary was carefully mapped out for them, as it is for all visitors to China. I know from experience that I could take any non-Philadelphian on a guided tour of Philadelphia that would leave my visitor breathlessly impressed with the beauty and orderliness of my home town. I could also give a guided tour that would make William Penn wish he had never started this place. It all depends on where you are taken, and on what you see.

Pierre Ryckmans is a Belgian scholar who has studied China and Chinese art for the past twenty years. His wife is Chinese, and Dr. Ryckmans speaks and writes the language. In 1974 he published Ombres Chinoises (Chinese Shadows in English), to counter the overdone praise of China. He published it, not because he dislikes China, but because he loves China, and feels pained that so many inaccurate portraits have been drawn of that enormously complex land. His book, published under the pseudonym Simon Leys, created an immediate furor. It is a remarkable, funny, ironic guide to the foibles of trying to learn about China when one is not Chinese:

In the tours for foreign visitors, always superbly organized, anything that might be unpredictable, unexpected, spontaneous, or improvised is ruthlessly eliminated. . . . The Maoist authorities have accomplished a strange tour de force: they have managed to limit China—that immense and varied universe, for the exploration of which, however superficial, a lifetime is inadequate—to a narrow, incredibly constricted area. China has hundreds of cities; only about a dozen are open to ordinary foreigners. . . . Out of the tens of thousands of villages where more than eighty percent of the Chinese people live, foreigners visit less than a dozen. . . . Out of 800 million Chinese, foreigners meet about sixty individuals. . . . The only Chinese people one can talk to without getting into trouble are servants (personnel provided by the service section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), bureaucrats one meets at official gatherings, guides and interpreters provided by the government's travel agency, and "professional friends." These last are bureaucrats on leave from the Foreign Office on temporary assignment to keep foreigners company; their names—they are a few—come up time and again in the many accounts written by travellers who think, naively, that they had managed to make friends in China.

Ryckmans' account (his pseudonym was adopted to avoid being banned from China, but angry French Maoists dug it out) has been recently seconded by Marylin Bender, an Esquire editor who was one of the lucky ones who got to take a Pan Am tour this year to China (China granted 2000 openings this year to Pan Am, and they were quickly and quietly grabbed up). She confirms Ryckmans' contention that everything is organized, and that, because of the language barrier, the guides become the only way that "we could try to learn as much as we could about political and social currents."

Now that there is a growing range of Chinese writing about China, outsiders have a much greater opportunity to attempt an understanding of this remarkable society.
Who are the new Chinese dissidents? For the most part, they are victims or protagonists from China's Cultural Revolution—a period of upheaval that began in 1966 and may be said to have ended with the arrest of Chiang Ching, Mao's widow, and three other radical leaders (the "Gang of Four") and the purging of their followers from various ranks of the government—all this in 1977. Eleven years of factionalizing, in-fighting, "struggle sessions," work stoppage, and a near-destruction of the educational system. People died in the Cultural Revolution—perhaps thousands. Whole cities and provinces were thrown into a state of near civil war. People on the "right" and on the "left" were kidnapped, held prisoner, and sometimes tortured. Careers were ruined, families were torn apart, and some of those "disgraced" or humiliated ended up committing suicide. The "remarkable discipline" of the Chinese people began to unravel, and literally hundreds of factions and secret societies sprung up around the country—many with their own presses, or with other avenues of communicating with the "masses." The supposed unity of the 800,000,000 Chinese people behind "the thought of Chairman Mao" was revealed as a contrived litany for the consumption of outsiders. The reality was that China, like every other large society, had its share of differing opinion.

The official Maoist version of the Cultural Revolution goes something like this: After the Revolution a bureaucracy developed in the People's Republic that was more interested in its privileges than in radical change. This bureaucratic elite—led and symbolized by Liu Shao-Chi (Mao's one-time comrade-in-arms, and heir apparent before the Cultural Revolution)—wanted to re-establish many of the old, feudal qualities of Chinese society. They especially wanted to assure rank and privilege for themselves, their friends, and their families. In other words, they were on the way toward establishing a "new class," as had happened in the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao realized that these "capitalist-roads" were subverting the goals of the Revolution, and he called upon the students to "hold high the red banner" and to launch a thorough purging of these bad elements. This struggle spread to the workers, and then to the peasants, and was the cause for much conflict and "re-education."

Here the "Maoist" consensus ends. The official government line is that the Gang of Four was using "left" slogans for basically "right" ends—that is, personal aggrandizement. Many radical Maoists, however, believe that the bureaucrats have come back into command, and that the struggle must continue. So, this accounts for one dissident faction.

There is another version of the Cultural Revolution. It goes like this: Mao was as interested in his personal power and preeminence as he was in the "Revolution." With his failures in leadership during the "Great Leap Forward" period, he had lost out to a more "pragmatic" wing of the party, led by Liu Shao-Chi. The Cultural Revolution was Mao's cynical strategy for regaining power, and passing it on to whomever he pleased—and the students and workers who followed his lead were just so much cannon fodder.

Here is what the fictional Hsia Yu-min, and character in The Coldest Winter in Peking and a follower of the "moderate" line of Chou En-lai, has to say about the "leadership" of Mao during the Cultural Revolution:

The one who had responsibility for the Party for such a long time, did he have any thoughts of "rule by law"? Not at all, no, not in the least bit.... So long as it fitted in with his whims and his strategic needs, any law of the land or Party could be breached. Why? What is democracy to his way of thinking? It isn't worth a fart.

Within the Party, he assumed the role of paterfamilias. In the internal organizations of the Party, the military, and the government, he quite naturally formed a clique from his hometown region. Therefore, the Chinese People's Republic was changed from a country ruled by a single party to a country ruled by a single family. If you take a look at the time of the Cultural Revolution, a single word or phrase from his lips became instantly the law of the land. Not only from him, but from his "Dowager Empress" [Chiang Ching]. Whoever dared to offend her would either be crushed to pieces or else would be spending years at hard labor in a dung heap, be he revolutionary stalwart or merely a seventy-year-old veteran.
The Coldest Winter in Peking (Doubleday, 1978, $10.00) is a novel written by a recent Chinese exile under the nom-de-plume of Hsia Chih-yen. A former member of the technical intelligence section of the Academy of Sciences of China, he was a victim of the purges in the Cultural Revolution, and many of the stories in his novel come from first-hand experience. Others come from the accounts of friends who also have left the People's Republic. This book, along with the recently-published The Execution of Mayor Yin (Indiana University Press, 1978, $8.95) provides an intimate and image-shattering look into the "dark" side of recent Chinese history.

Chen Jo-hsi is the author of Mayor Yin. Born in Taiwan, both she and her husband became ardent Maoists while studying in the U.S. They immigrated to China in 1966, thrilled at the idea of becoming part of their country's exciting experiment; 1966—just in time for the Cultural Revolution, in which their talents as "intellectuals," and their non-mainland origins put them under a cloud. Discouraged by their personal odyssey, and by what they saw happening around them, they left China seven years later.

Neither of the authors of these two remarkable books is anti-communist. Both authors are at pains to avoid being used by people who would like to discredit the Chinese Revolution.

Often, one personal account can say what thousands of generalities can never convey. Here are two stories that may help portray some of the pain and tragedy that has accompanied events in China.

The first is the story of Young Tiger, a high school graduate who was sent to the mountains of rugged Shansi Province to work in a "pioneering" commune. After one year, he runs away from his post, and walks and hitchhikes his way back to Peking. His "Big Brother," C'hi Yi-lung, is enormously upset when he hears of this, and fearing family disgrace as well as personal embarrassment, orders his brother to go back to his assignment. Young Tiger refuses, telling his brother of the hardships he has had to endure:

Older brother, when I was first assigned, though I was really dead set against going, did I not go all the same? ... I made up my mind to work hard and to improve my ideological thinking. I tried my best to be a progressive intellectual youth. . . .

I had not thought that as soon as we arrived at the commune, the cadres would interrogate each one of us. They were bent on finding out my allowance each month . . . They dispatched a bunch of us, all from families who could not send them much money, to production teams deep in the mountain ranges, which were among the most barren and impoverished places. The children of high-ranking cadres, who could get thirty to fifty yuan from home, all stayed in the production teams and the commune headquarters in the river valleys.

Those of us who went to the mountains, on the other hand, lived in mud caves, swinging a pick at a rock pile, uprooting trees, digging ditches, constructing stone walls. Every month, each one of us received thirty pounds of coarse-grain gruel; there was no sauce, no meat, no vegetables. . . . We had to dig out wild plants and vegetables from the rocky crevices and our hands and feet swelled up when we ate them. We figured our wages at the end of the month, and they were not even enough to pay for the gruel we had eaten.

For those of us with no connections or no money, the debts mounted. If we worked until the day we died, we would still not be able to work our way out of them.

If we credit the stories in The Coldest Winter, then the experience of Young Tiger is not an isolated incident, but an example of the lives of thousands, perhaps millions of Chinese—especially those who happen to be out of favor with the powers-that-be.

The second story comes from Mayor Yin. It is the story of Jen Hsiu-lan, a woman in her sixties who had fought in the struggle against the Japanese, and then in the Revolution. She symbolizes the older revolutionaries who gave so much to the Communist cause, only to find themselves disgraced and humiliated during the Cultural Revolution.

Jen is denounced as a "May Sixteenth" type—that is an ultra-leftist—and is forced to undergo a severe "study class" in order to correct her "crimes." This "class" consists of five or six people who surround the recalcitrant, and subject her to "criticism" night and day. They are with her at all times; they even go to the bathroom with her.

Jen is kept in a cottage with the six members of her "class." The windows are barred, and the doors are locked:

Three of the rooms were furnished with tables, chairs, and benches. Two of them had evidently been used by the guards for their meetings, as the walls were covered with portraits of Mao Tse-tung and various rousing slogans. . . . The third room must have been where Jen Hsiu-lan's thought-reform sessions had taken place, since the walls were all covered with huge black characters and six-inch long exclamation marks. The slogans exhorted her to "Bow Your Head and Confess!" and "Turn Back to the Shore!" One read "Even in Death There Is No Place to Hide!"

Contriving to go to the bathroom alone, the victim apparently escapes, and the entire commune is turned out to find her. Three days later she is found, in the cesspool underneath the toilet. She has committed suicide. For daring to escape from her correction, she is
ceremoniously expelled from the Party. In a final tragic twist, several weeks later a plot by Minister of Defense Lin Piao is uncovered. Now all the “May Sixteenth” types are exonerated, and their accusers are denounced as “followers of Lin Piao.” The roles are reversed, and the former persecutors are subjected to “thought reform.” But Jen Hsiu-lan is forgotten in the turmoil, a hapless victim of the Peking power struggle.

For the few stories that come to us in the West, there are many, many more that circulate in oral form within China. These are a form of “oral samizdat” (samizdat is the Russian term for self-published dissident literature), and they give evidence to a strong current of criticism and dissent inside China. In The Siang River Runs Red, a 400-page oral novel, a son denounces his own father—only to throw himself into the river because of his regret.

In A True Story, a Red Guard denounces his favorite teacher—though he loves him dearly. His teacher is criticized, and then taken out and shot. In Ah Hsia, a woman factory worker becomes a part-time prostitute and ends up in bed with the supposedly puritanical head of her factory.

What all of these stories point to is not that the Chinese Revolution was a sham. Rather, they try to “tell it like it is” about the hidden side of modern Chinese history. Their goal is the goal of literature the world around: to exhort, to educate, even to amuse. We in the U.S. who remain sympathetic to the Chinese Revolution would do well to allow ourselves to be taught by these stories of dissent. If we do, then perhaps we can one day have real Chinese friends—rather than ones the power-holders of the moment would like to provide for us.

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A Review of Dissident Literature


**Prisoner of Mao**, by Bao Ruo-wang (Jean Pasqualli) and Rudolph Chelminski, Penguin Books, 1976, $2.50, 326 pages. A detailed account of life in China’s prisons and workcamps by a man who had dual Chinese and French citizenship, and was finally freed when France recognized China. Millions of criminals, and unknown numbers of political prisoners have been exiled to these camps, and this book gives an account of the hardships, the courage, the friendships, and the methods of “thought-reform” that were in use from 1957 to 1964.

**The Chinese Machiavelli**, by Dennis and Ching Ping Bloodworth, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976, $10.00, 346 pages. A surprising and easily-read account of the traditions of thought, warfare, and government over 3000 years of Chinese history. Constantly draws parallels between the infighting and intrigues of the past, and the maneuvering of the present.

**Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China**, by Peter R. Moody, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1977, $14.95, 342 pages. The only detailed survey of dissent within and outside China that I have so far discovered. This book appears to be thorough, scholarly, and extremely valuable to the student or scholar who wants knowledge in depth.

**Five Books on the Cultural Revolution:**


- **Liu Shao-Ch’i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution**, by Lowell Dittmer, U. of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, $4.95 paperback, 386 pages. A sympathetic account of the life, thought, contributions, and downfall of the man who was Mao’s heir, but whose name is officially synonymous with counter-revolution. Liu’s “pragmatic” line is in many ways being resurrected by the current leadership group.

- **The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao**, by Jaap van Ginneken, Discus, 1977, $2.50, 363 pages. A blow-by-blow account of the tumults and power shifts in the Cultural Revolution. Revised to include details of the fall of the “Gang of Four.”


- **Party, Army and Masses in China**, by Lisio Maitan, NLB, London, 1976, $20.00, 373 pages. (Available from Pathfinder Press, N.Y.C.) An account by an Italian Marxist who sympathizes with the radical faction in the Cultural Revolution—many of whose members are now in prison, exile, or disgrace. Four key articles on Chinese dissent:


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CALENDAR

October

2—"The Modern Search for Wholeness" will be the opening theme of the October series of Monday evening lectures at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Led by Helen G. Hole. 8 p.m., no charge.

6—"Nonviolence In Everyday Life" will be the theme at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Led by Frank Pineo and Marian Dockhorn. Will consider difficulties and joys of retirement. Cost $55.

9—"The Way of Metaphor" is second in Pendle Hill series. Led by Helen G. Hole, 8 p.m., no charge.


14—Western Quarterly Meeting at Camp Hilltop (near Downingtown, PA). Date has been changed (formerly 10/21). Programs for all ages, visitors welcome. For meal and overnight reservations contact: Lewis L. Palmer, 215-274-8261.

16—"Love Calls Us to the Things of This World" is the topic of the third Monday evening lecture at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Led by Helen G. Hole, 8 p.m., no charge.

18-20—International Conference on Teaching the Lessons of the Holocaust will be held at the Holiday Inn, 4th and Arch Sts., Philadelphia, PA. Address by Elie Wiesel; art exhibit "The Artists of the Camps"; workshops. More information from the National Institute on the Holocaust, P.O.B. 2147, Philadelphia, PA 19153.

20-22—Couples Workshop located in the Bucks Quarter area outside Philadelphia. Intended as enrichment for couples, not therapy, counseling or encounter group. Led by Brad and Pat McBee Sheek.

23—"The Intersection of the Timeless With Time" will be the fourth Monday evening at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Led by Helen G. Hole, 8 p.m., no charge.

27-29—"Single Again" is the theme of the weekend at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Intended for those separated or divorced, will focus on self-renewal and personal growth. Led by Francis Dreisbach and Alex Scott. Cost: $55.

30—"The Mind's Descent Into the Heart" will be the last Monday evening lecture in October at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, PA. Led by Helen G. Hole, 8 p.m., no charge.

November

11—AFSC Annual Meeting at Friends Center, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA. 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
For Rent

This Cuenavaca casa is a happy place for a family, friendly group or small seminar. Congenial staff, garden, view, 45-minute walk to town. Ideal base for a visit to Mexico. Available by week or month, August-September. Mid-October - mid-December.

Box N-719, Friends Journal.

The Barclay Home, West Chester. First floor rooms for rent. 4-6 rooms shared. July 1-August 31. Rental: $12 with or without meals. Phone: 237-2975.

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Positions Vacant

RE/YF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOB OPPORTUNITY—Religious Education/Young Friends Committee of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting is seeking an Executive Secretary to replace Caroline C. Pineo, who is retiring. Position opening March 1979. Applicants should send a letter indicating interest in the position and an outline of qualifications. Apply by May 31 to: Head of School, Friends School, Philadelphia 19110.

Alternative farming community with mentally handicapped adults seeks co-workers. Responsibilities include housekeeping plus working in weaver, woodshop, bakery, garden, or greenhouse. Room/board, medical/dental expenses provided. Ongoing counseling of residents. Write: Community House, Inc., Woodstock, VT 05091.

Wider Quaker Fellowship, 1508 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, offers 3/ year mailings of Quaker-oriented literature.

Song for Quakers: 52 simple, original, meaningful songs for meetings, schools, families. $2.50. Dorothy Glessner, 37245 Woodside Lane, Fraser, MI 48026.
JAMAICA PLAIN—Worship 11 a.m.; fellowship hour 12, First-day. Beacon Hill Friends House, 8 Chestnut St., Boston 02116. Phone: 227-9118.

CAMBRIDGE—Longfellow Park (near Harvard Square, just off Brattle St.). Two meetings for worship each First-Day, 9:30 a.m. and 11 a.m. Phone: 671-6663.

DORCHESTER - JAMAICA PLAIN—Sunday evenings 5 p.m. in homes. Worship, FDS, soup, and discussion. Phone: 522-3745.

FRAMINGHAM—841 Edmans Rd. (2 mi. W of Natick). First-day worship. Phone: 522-3745.

SOUTH YARMOUTH, CAPE COD—North Main St. Worship and First-day school, 10 a.m. Phone: 432-1131.

WELLESLEY—Meeting for worship and Sunday School, 10:30 a.m. at 26 Benvenuto Street. Phone: 227-0286.

WEST FALMOUTH, VIllage—Worship, 10:30 a.m.

DETROIT—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship 10:30 a.m. Call 371-1754 or 313-334-3666.

ST. PAUL—Twin Cities Friends Meeting. Worship, 10 a.m. Unprogrammed worship 11 a.m. Phone: 615-9005.

MINNEAPOLIS—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 314-341-3754 or 404-6767.

ROCKFORD—Preparative Meeting, Sundays 11 a.m., Elkina Church Educational Bldg., First & Elm Sts. Phone: 314-341-3754 or 2464.

ST. LOUIS—Meeting, 2539 Rockford Ave., Rock Hill, 11 a.m. Phone: 522-3116.

SEYMOUR—Discourse 10 a.m., unprogrammed worship 11, Wiltsee, Jim/Donna Rickabaugh, Sunnyside Farm, Rt. 1, Seymour 65746.

Nebraska

LINCOLN—3319 S. 46th. Phone: 488-4178. Worship 10 a.m. Sunday school 11 a.m.

OMAHA—Unprogrammed worship. 453-7916.

Nevada

LAS VEGAS—Paradise Meeting: worship 12 noon, 3451 Middleby. Phone: 887-8107 or 865-8442.

RENO—Worship usually 5 p.m. on Sunday, 350 Granville Dr. Phone: 355-3600 or 522-9588 to verify.

New Hampshire

CONCORD—Worship 10 a.m. Children welcomed and cared for. Merrimack Valley Day Care Center, 19 N. Fruit St. Phone: 783-0628.

DOVER MONTHLY MEETING


WEST Epping Meeting—Friends St., West Epping. Worship 1st & 3rd Sundays at 10:30. Fritz Bell, clerk. Phone: 865-9453.

HANOVER—Meeting for worship, Sunday 10 a.m. Meetings in Friends House, 295 Main St. Phone: 227-9116.

BARNEGAT—Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 458-5817.

GLOVER—Unprogrammed worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 334-3366.

DETROIT—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship 10:30 a.m. Call 371-1754 or 313-334-3666.

MINNEAPOLIS—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 615-9005.

ROLLA—Preparative Meeting, Sundays 11 a.m., Elkina Church Educational Bldg., First & Elm Sts. Phone: 314-341-3754 or 2464.

ST. LOUIS—Meeting, 2539 Rockford Ave., Rock Hill, 11 a.m. Phone: 522-3116.

SEYMOUR—Discourse 10 a.m., unprogrammed worship 11, Wiltsee, Jim/Donna Rickabaugh, Sunnyside Farm, Rt. 1, Seymour 65746.

Nebraska

LINCOLN—3319 S. 46th. Phone: 488-4178. Worship 10 a.m. Sunday school 11 a.m.

OMAHA—Unprogrammed worship. 453-7916.

New Hampshire

CONCORD—Worship 10 a.m. Children welcomed and cared for. Merrimack Valley Day Care Center, 19 N. Fruit St. Phone: 783-0628.

DOVER MONTHLY MEETING


WEST Epping Meeting—Friends St., West Epping. Worship 1st & 3rd Sundays at 10:30. Fritz Bell, clerk. Phone: 865-9453.

HANOVER—Meeting for worship, Sunday 10 a.m. Meetings in Friends House, 295 Main St. Phone: 227-9116.

BARNEGAT—Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 458-5817.

GLOVER—Unprogrammed worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 334-3366.

DETROIT—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship 10:30 a.m. Call 371-1754 or 313-334-3666.

MINNEAPOLIS—Meeting, Sundays 10:30 a.m. Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Phone: 615-9005.

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LONG ISLAND (Queens, Nassau, Suffolk Counties) — Ongoing daily and weekend meetings for worship, 11 a.m. First days, unless otherwise noted.


FLUSHING—137-29 Northern Blvd. Discussion group 10 a.m. First-day school 11 a.m. Open house 2-4 p.m. 1st and 3rd First-days except 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th months.

HUNTINGTON-LLOYD HARBOR — Meeting followed by discussion and simple lunch, Friends Westwood College, Plover Lane. Phone: 516-323-5672.

JERicho — Old Jericho Tpke., off Rt. 25, 5 1/2 mi. of intersection with Rts. 106 and 107.

LOCUST VALLEY-MATINEOCOKE — Duck Pond and Piping Rock Rds.

MANHASSET-North Broadway at Shelter Rock Rd. First-day school 9:45 a.m.

NEW HAVEN — Meeting for worship and First-day school 11 a.m. Meetinghouse Road.

NEW PALM—Phone 255-0270 or 255-7532.

NEW YORK—First-days for worship, 9:45 a.m. 11th, 12th, 20th, 21st, 29th, 30th; Charlotte Place (15th St.), Manhattan. Others 11 a.m. only.

Eli Hall, Columbia University 110 Schermerhorn St., Brooklyn

Phone 212-777-6866 (Mon.-Fri. 9-5) about First-day school, meetings, information.

ONEONTA—10:30 a.m. worship 1st and 3rd Sundays. 11th Ford Ave. Call 433-2367 (Oneonta) or 476-2844 (Dehi) for location. Babysitting available.

OREGON—Meeting for worship and First-day school 11 a.m. East Quaker St. at Freeman Rd. Phone: 682-3105.

POUGHKEEPSIE—249 Hooker Ave. Phone: 454-2870. Unprogrammed meeting. 9:15 a.m.; Saturday school. 10:15 a.m.; programmed meeting, 11:15 a.m. (Summer worship, 10 a.m.).

PURCHAS for worship and First-day school 11 a.m. Purchase St. (Rt. 120) at Lake St. Co-clerks: Nancy First; Bittersweet L., Mt. Kisco, N.Y. 10549; and Joyce Hassie, 88 Downs, Stamford, CT 06902, 203-324-9730.

QUAKER STREET—Unprogrammed, 11 a.m. Sundays from mid-April to mid-October, in the meetinghouse near Quaker Street village, Rt. 7, south of US Rt. 20. For winter meetings call Joel Flick, 518-894-2034.

ROCHESTER—Meeting June hours 11 till Sept. 3, 10 a.m. Babysitting sometimes available. 41 Westminster Rd., Rochester 14607.

ROCKLAND—Meeting for worship and First-day school, 11 a.m. 50 Leier Rd., Blauvelt.

RYE—Milford Rd., one-half mile south of Playland Parkway, Sundays, 10:30 a.m.


Syracuse—Meeting for worship at 821 Euclid Ave., 10:30 a.m. Sunday.

North Carolina

ASHVILLE — Meeting, French Broad YWCA. Sun., 11 a.m. Phone 255-1214.

BOONE—Unprogrammed meeting Sunday 11 a.m., Wesley Foundation. Call 704-284-5812 or 919-877-4966.

CHAPEL HILL—Meeting for worship, 11 a.m. Clerk: Dink Sprout, phone 295-5291.

CHARLOTTE—Meeting for worship, 10 a.m. First-day school, 11 a.m. Phone: 704-399-8456 or 537-5806.

DURHAM—Meeting for worship, 10:30 a.m. First-day school, 11:45 a.m. at 404 Alexander Ave. Contact: David Smith, 919-888-4488 or Bill Clarke, 286-4470. Unprogrammed.

FAYETTEVILLE—Meeting 11 a.m. each First-day at Quaker House, 223 Hillside Ave. A simple meal follows. Contact Charlotte Klebs, 919-485-4950 or Bill Shollar, 485-3315.

GREENSBORO—Friendship meeting (unprogrammed, meeting 9 a.m.; church school 9:45 a.m.; meeting worship, 11 a.m. Dorothy S. Mason, clerk, and David W. Bills, pastoral minister.

RALEIGH—Unprogrammed meeting 10 a.m., 120 Woodburn Rd. Clerk: Doug Jenette, 834-2223.

WILKESBORO—Unprogrammed worship, 7:30 a.m. each First-day, St. Paul’s Church Parish House. Call Ben Barr, 964-3006.

WOODLAND—Cedar Grove Meeting, Sabbath school, 10 a.m.; meeting, 11 a.m. Janis A. Sams, clerk.

Ohio


CANTON—Quakers meet Sundays at 11 a.m. for unprogrammed worship. Christian Arts Center, 29th & Market Ave. N. Phone: 444-7767 or 333-4305.

CINCINNATI—Clifton Friends Meeting, Wesley Foundation Bldg., 217 Clifton Ave. Meeting for worship 10 a.m. Phone: 961-2295.

CINCINNATI—Community Meeting (United) FGC and FUM-Unprogrammed worship 9:30 a.m.; 3960 Winding Way. 42259. Phone: 513-861-3353. Edwin Moon, clerk.

CLEVELAND—Meeting for worship and First-day school 11 a.m., 100 E. 108th Sts., Cleveland 44108. Contact Joe Davis, clerk, 422-7668. 1731 S. Main St., Cleveland.

COLUMBUS—Unprogrammed meeting, 10 a.m. 1954 Indiana Ave. Call Catherine Crossman, 686-4327, or Roger Warren, 686-4037.

DAYTON—(FGC) Unprogrammed meeting for worship and First-day school, 10:30 a.m. 1518 Cave St. Phone: 278-0415 or 278-2284.

FINDLAY—Bowling Green area—FGC. Contact Joe Davis, clerk, 422-7668. 1731 S. Main St., Findlay.

Hudson—Unprogrammed Friends meeting for worship, Sunday 4 p.m. at The Old Church or the Green, 1 East Broadway. Call 216-619-9800. Worship 9:30 a.m. and First-day school 10:30 a.m.

KENT—Meeting for worship and First-day school, 10:30 a.m.; 1106 Fairfield Ave. Phone: 877-5336.

OBERLIN—Friends Monthly Meeting, unprogrammed, 11 a.m. YW Lounge, Wilder Hall. Sept.- May. 774-5139.

SALEM—Wilbur Friends, unprogrammed meeting. First-day school, 9:30 a.m.; worship, 10:30 a.m.

TOLEDO—Allowed meeting. Meetings irregular on call. Visitors contact Jan Suter, 863-3174, or David Taber, 876-6841.

WAYNESVILLE—Friends Meeting, Fourth and High Sts. First-day school 9:30 a.m.; unprogrammed worship, 10:45 a.m.

WILMINGTON—Camp Meeting (United) FUM & FGC. Unprogrammed worship, 10 a.m. College Ave. Contact: The Orms, 320-4119.

WOOSTER—Unprogrammed meeting and First-day school, 10:30 a.m.; Sw com College and Pine Sts. Phone: 264-8661.


OKlahoma

OKLAHOMA CITY—Meeting for worship, 10:30 a.m. Forum, 11 a.m. Shared lunch follows, 1115 SW 47th Information, 632-7574. Clerk, Cyrus Young, 781-2988.
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